Decentralization and Tax Competition Between Asymmetrical Local Governments : Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

Clément Carbonnier

doi:10.1177/1091142113482352

Journal Articles Public Finance Review Year : 2013

Decentralization and Tax Competition Between Asymmetrical Local Governments : Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

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Clément Carbonnier

Function : Author
PersonId : 5175
IdHAL : carbonnier
ORCID : 0000-0002-8520-8681
IdRef : 162302274

Théorie économique, modélisation et applications

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Economics and Finance

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Submitted on : Tuesday, October 27, 2020-10:45:51 AM

Last modification on : Friday, March 24, 2023-2:53:19 PM

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hal-02979493 , version 1 (27-10-2020)

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HAL Id : hal-02979493 , version 1
DOI : 10.1177/1091142113482352

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Clément Carbonnier. Decentralization and Tax Competition Between Asymmetrical Local Governments : Theoretical and Empirical Evidence. Public Finance Review, 2013, 4, pp.391-420. ⟨10.1177/1091142113482352⟩. ⟨hal-02979493⟩

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Decentralization and Tax Competition Between Asymmetrical Local Governments : Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

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