The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information - CY Cergy Paris Université
Journal Articles Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Year : 2013

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

Damien Besancenot
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 1014683
Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord
Delphine Dubart
  • Function : Author
ESSEC Business School
Radu Vranceanu
ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184)

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Chemical Sciences

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https://cyu.hal.science/hal-02979478

Submitted on : Tuesday, October 27, 2020-10:45:21 AM

Last modification on : Monday, June 12, 2023-11:40:04 AM

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hal-02979478 , version 1 (27-10-2020)

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Damien Besancenot, Delphine Dubart, Radu Vranceanu. The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2013, pp.239-247. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.029⟩. ⟨hal-02979478⟩

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UNIV-PARIS13 ESSEC CNRS UNIV-PARIS3 UNIV-CERGY CEPN SORBONNE-PARIS-NORD THEMA-UMR8184 CY-TECH-SM LABEX-ICCA
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